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Scarce evidence exists on the features, determinants and implications of
physicians’ dual practice, especially in resource-poor settings. This study
considered dual practice patterns in three African cities and the respective
markets for physician services, with the objective of understanding the influence
of local determinants on the practice. Forty-eight semi-structured qualitative
interviews were conducted in the three cities to understand features of the
practice and the respective markets. A survey was carried out in a sample of 331
physicians to explore their characteristics and decisions to work in public and
private sectors. Descriptive analysis and inferential statistics were employed to
explore differences in physicians’ engagement in dual practice across the three
locations. Different forms of dual practice were found to exist in the three cities,
with public physicians engaging in private practice outside but also inside public
facilities, in regulated as well as unregulated ways. Thirty-four per cent of the
respondents indicated that they worked in public practice only, and 11% that
they engaged exclusively in private practice. The remaining 55% indicated that
they engaged in some form of dual practice, 31% ‘outside’ public facilities, 8%
‘inside’ and 16% both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’. Local health system governance and
the structure of the markets for physician services were linked to the forms of
dual practice found in each location, and to their prevalence. Our analysis
suggests that physicians’ decisions to engage in dual practice are influenced by
supply and demand factors, but also by how clearly separated public and private
markets are. Where it is possible to provide little-regulated services within public
infrastructure, less incentive seems to exist to engage in the formal private
sector, with equity and efficiency implications for service provision. The study
shows the value of analysing health markets to understand physicians’
engagement in professional activities, and contributes to an evidence base for
its regulation.
Keywords Dual practice, multiple job-holding, human resources for health, physicians in
Africa, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, health system research in low-
income countries
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KEY MESSAGES
 Different forms of dual practice were found to exist in three African capital cities, with public physicians engaging in
private practice outside but also inside public facilities, in regulated as well as unregulated ways.
 Thirty-four per cent of physicians indicated they engaged in public practice only. Eleven per cent indicated that they
engaged in private practice only. The remaining 55% indicated that they engaged in some form of dual practice. The
proportion of dual practitioners was found to be consistent across the three locations.
 Local health system governance and structure of the markets for physician services were linked to the forms of dual
practice found in each location, and to their prevalence.
 Analysing structure and features of local markets for physician services is key to understand physicians’ decisions to
engage in dual practice, and identify suitable policy options.
Introduction
Physicians’ simultaneous engagement in multiple clinical pro-
fessions is very common worldwide. Those who combine a mix
of public and private sector work are most often referred to as
‘engaging in dual practice’ (Eggleston and Bir 2006; Garcı´a-
Prado and Gonza´lez 2011; Socha and Bech 2011), as ‘multiple
or dual job-holders’ (Berman and Cuizon 2004; Jan et al. 2005),
or as undertaking ‘multiple income-generating activities’
(Jumpa et al. 2007). The term ‘moonlighting’ (Biglaiser and
Albert Ma 2007) has also been used, implying an element of
illegality about the private sector work of public sector
physicians.
Several studies have documented the existence as well as
prevalence of dual practice in low, middle and high-income
countries alike. Gruen et al. (2002) refer to a study in
Bangladesh according to which up to 80% of public sector
doctors engage in some form of dual practice. Berman and
Cuizon (2004) report a similar proportion among general
practitioners in Indonesia, and in Egypt. In Thailand,
Prakongsai et al. (2003) estimated that 69% of public sector
physicians had private sector activities. In Europe, Humphrey
and Russell (2004) find that in the UK, 63% of public hospital
consultants and specialists maintain a private practice alongside
their job in the National Health Service, while Dolado and
Felgueroso (2007) found that 20% of Spanish public sector
physicians have a second job.
There is consensus in the literature that not enough evidence
exists on the net impact of the practice on population access to
services (Socha and Bech 2011). Berman and Cuizon (2004)
argue that dual practice may reduce quantity and quality of
public services, as it undermines the ethos of public service,
creates grounds for absenteeism and shirking and diverts
resources and patients to private practice. A common argument
in favour of dual practice is that it helps retain skilled
physicians in low-paid public posts (Ferrinho et al. 2004; Jan
et al. 2005), and creates an opportunity for physicians to update
their skills in the private sector. Gonza´lez (2004) argues that
dual practice might improve service quality in the public sector,
since physicians would seek to establish their private sector
credentials through quality services offered in the public sector.
The possibility of practising legally both in public and private
clinics has also been credited with reducing unofficial payments
in the former (Garcı´a-Prado and Gonza´lez 2007). Eggleston and
Bir (2006) suggest that, through price discrimination, dual
practice allows more services to be offered to the public, and at
a more equitable price.
The opportunity to generate additional income has largely
been considered as physicians’ main motivation to engage in
dual practice (Ferrinho et al. 1998), although improving
professional prestige (Gonza´lez 2004) and complementarities
between public and private practices (Chawla 1996) have also
been cited as additional factors. Ferrinho et al. (2004) conclude
that, particularly in low-income countries, health professionals
engage in dual practice because of the gap existing between
professional and economic expectations and what public
employment can offer.
Despite the literature on the subject, evidence is scarce on
features and determinants of dual practice, particularly in
resource-poor settings. This article seeks to explain differences
in the patterns of dual practice in three African cities by
analysing physicians’ professional engagement and the charac-
teristics of health governance and local markets for medical
services.
Background
The three locations were selected not only because of their
similarities in terms of cultural heritage and organization of the
respective health systems, but also because of their different
stages of economic development, which was expected to offer
insight into the impact of evolving health markets on physician
dual practice.
Granted independence from Portugal in 1975, Cape Verde has
made the transition to middle-income status. In 2010 Cape
Verde’s health expenditures were USD154 per capita, the
majority of which was public (Table 1). The Agostinho Neto
Central Hospital (ANCH) in Praia is considered the pinnacle of
curative services across the ten islands; the medical private
sector is liberalized, and private practice within public premises
is legally permitted.
Marred by civil war and political instability since independ-
ence, Guinea Bissau is one of Africa’s poorest and least
developed countries. Health expenditures are USD47 per
capita. The public health sector network consists of seven
hospitals, including Bissau’s Sima˜o Mendes Central Hospital
(SMCH). Private health expenditure represented 90% of total
health expenditure in 2010 (World Bank 2013). Private health
practice was legalized in 1986, but no regulation exists of
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private health practice within public institutions. ‘Private’
services (those for which a fee is charged) are available
across all public facilities (Einardo´ttir 2011).
After emerging from civil war in 1992 with its health system
in tatters, Mozambique is currently developing rapidly because
of the recent discovery of mineral resources, which has
increased national income as well as inequalities (MPD 2010).
There were 1105 physicians registered in the country, most of
who trained in the country’s four medical schools. The Maputo
Central Hospital (MCH) is Mozambique’s largest treatment
institution, based in the country’s densely populated capital
city; private provision of health services was legalized in 1992,
including private services offered through the MCH ‘special
clinic’ (GoM 1992).
Methodology
The present study set out to investigate physician dual practice
in three African capital cities, with the objective of understand-
ing the influence of local conditions on its forms and prevalence.
According to our framework (Figure 1), the form and prevalence
of physicians’ simultaneous engagement in public and private
clinical activities critically depend on local factors linked to the
health system’s governance (regulation and implementing
institutions), as well as to the structure of the market for
physician services (supply, demand and product). Physicians’
personal characteristics are considered independent of these
local determinants and are not explored in this article.
We define the product as all clinical services provided by
physicians in the public and private sectors. Given the lack of
data to apply alternatives, we used the simple geopolitical
boundary approach (Zwanzinger et al. 1994) to identify the
geographical scope of the market. We discuss the limitations of
these two methodological choices in our discussion.
A two-phase, sequential mixed methods study was employed
to understand physicians’ engagement in dual practice and the
respective local markets (Creswell 2002). The first phase was a
qualitative exploration of issues identified as relevant by the
economic and industrial organization literature, and in a second
data collection phase, surveys were conducted among phys-
icians to take stock of dual practice in the three capital cities
and measure quantitatively concepts identified as important
through the interviews. Multiple secondary data sources were
used to gain further perspectives on the market for physician
services in the three cities. The Ministry of Health’s (MoH)
activity and personnel statistics were used to analyse demand
and supply of services in the three capital cities; regulatory and
salary information were retrieved from parliamentary bills and
ministerial decrees.
Qualitative interviews
We individually interviewed a purposive sample of 48 public
and private sector physicians, as well as key health policy-
makers identified with the help of local MoHs and Medical
Councils (Table S1 in supplementary data). The interview guide
drew on the dual practice as well as the health systems and
industrial organization literature, and aimed to explore issues
identified as relevant including: the features of demand and
supply of physicians’ services, characteristics of the product
offered, market structure and regulation, governance and
incentives (see interview guide in the supplementary data).
Interviews were all conducted by the principal investigator
and by one research assistant, tape-recorded and transcribed.
The directed content analysis approach (Hsieh and Shannon
2005) was employed to analyse the interviews, with coding
categories derived from the relevant dual practice literature.
Triangulation across each group of respondents and relevant
documentary evidence were used to gain a deeper understand-
ing of contrasting opinions on key themes.
The surveys
Surveys were used to collect data from a representative sample
of physicians working in the three capital cities on physician
characteristics, their working time allocation, motivation to
work in public and private sectors and perceptions of regula-
tion. MoHs’ and Medical Councils’ physician databases were
used to identify as complete as possible a list of registered
physicians in the three cities (Table S2 in the statistical
supplementary data).
Given the limited size of the health sector in Praia and
Bissau, the survey questionnaire was administered in person to
100% of medical doctors working in these two capital cities. The
response rates for Praia and Bissau were 79.7% and 80.5%,
respectively. For Maputo, where the physician population was
Table 1 Selected characteristics for the three study locations
Characteristic Cape Verde Guinea Bissau Mozambique
Country’s GDP per capita (PPP)a 3984 1186 942
Total health expenditures per capita (current prices, 2010 USD) 154.6 46.9 21.3
Private health expenditures per capita (current prices, 2010 USD) 38.6 42.2 6.0
Position in the Human Development Index (out of 187)b 133 176 184
Physicians registered in the countryc 400 172 1105
Physicians residing in the capital citiesc 131 127 487
Population in capital citiesd 131 453 387 908 1 178 116
Note: Gross Domestic Product (GDP); USD Purchasing Power Parity (PPP); United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
aThe World Bank (2012).
bUNDP (2011).
cNational Medical Councils (2012).
dNational Statistical Institutes.
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considerably larger, we surveyed a simple random sample of
physicians drawn from the MoH and Medical Council data-
bases. As many physicians from the original sample turned out
to be retired, dead or working outside Maputo upon contact, we
proceeded to identify a further sampling fraction. As a sample
of 30% of the population is, under certain conditions, con-
sidered acceptable for estimating prevalence of common char-
acteristics (Aguiar 2007; Lohr 2009), we stopped recruiting
survey participants when our target proportion was reached. Of
the overall estimated population across the three cities 51.8%
agreed to participate, 7.1% refused and 41.1% could not be
located (Table S2 in the statistical supplementary data).
The survey questionnaire contained 31 questions about
physicians’ general characteristics, allocation of time through
professional activities, public and private sector work charac-
teristics and regulation of the profession (see survey question-
naire in the supplementary data). Some questions were
designed to produce either multiple choice or closed-ended
answers, while for others, respondents were asked to state their
preferences in a 4-degree Likert scale. In order to measure the
association between the dependent and independent variables
and its statistical significance, adjusted odds ratio, confidence
intervals (CIs) for the adjusted odds ratio, Wald statistics and
respective P-values were computed.
The surveys were conducted in three separate teams by 10
local data collectors with a health sector background, trained
and supported by a team of researchers from the Institute of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (IHMT). The study had the
approval of the IHMT ethics committee. For the fieldwork in
Mozambique a further approval was requested and obtained
from the Mozambican MoH’s bio-ethics committee. IHMT
approval was considered sufficient by the MoHs in Cape
Verde and Guinea Bissau. Informed consent was obtained
from all participants in the interview and survey phases.
Results
In this section, survey and interview results are described to
explore the shape and prevalence of physicians’ engagement in
dual practice in the three cities, as well as the influence of
physicians’ personal characteristics on this engagement.
Evidence is presented from interviews and document analysis
on health system governance and the structure of markets for
physicians’ services.
Forms of dual practice
Our qualitative and quantitative data identified different forms
of dual practice in the three cities. A substantial proportion of
public sector physicians reported engaging with four types of
private clinical activities, involving different levels of public
resource use, regulation, quality and prices:
(a) Private practice ‘outside’ public practice: medical practi-
tioners operate or work in distinct private facilities,
unconnected physically or institutionally to public sector
facilities. This form of private services was found to be
‘thriving’ in Maputo, ‘developing, but still limited to
outpatient services’ in Praia, and ‘underdeveloped and
very diverse’ in Bissau.
(b) Private practice ‘beside’ public practice: medical services
offered by physicians in specialized institutions through
separate venues adjacent to the main hospital. In this
study the MCH ‘special clinic’ is the sole example,
although similar arrangements are described in the litera-
ture in other countries (Shirom 2001; Suwandono et al.
2001). These services are officially regulated and use
separate resources and accounting systems; patients pay
higher prices than in the main public facility. In the case
of MCH, a monthly fixed payment is made by the ‘special
clinic’ to the main hospital for ‘general expenditures’
(McPake et al. 2011).
(c) Private practice ‘within’ public practice facilities: dedicated
medical services offered within public premises outside
public sector hours, using public resources, partly regulated
by the hospital or by the department running them. This is
known as ‘special services’ in MCH and also occurs in
ANCH. The quality of such services does not appear to
differ much from those offered publicly, and patients
typically seek them to avoid waiting. Customers pay
Health systems governance
Regulation Implementing institutions
Structure of the local market for physician
services
Demand Supply Product
Forms of physicians’
engagement in public and
private services
Prevalence of
engagement in private
and public activities
Dual Practice
Physicians’
personal
characteristics
Figure 1 Conceptual framework for the analysis of physician dual practice.
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out-of-pocket a fee higher than that applicable in the main
public facility, a fixed proportion of which is transferred to
the hospital/department.
(d) Private practice ‘integrated’ into public practice: medical
services provided by resident physicians in public facilities,
held within public premises, using public resources, and
typically offered with no time restrictions and during
public sector shifts but on the basis of informal payment
(very common in Bissau, especially in SMCH). Such
services are illegal, and therefore erratic, not regulated
and seldom openly reported. Patients pay a variable fee,
typically higher than the official public sector fee, but
lower than the private sector standard, and none of this is
transferred back to the hospital.
In Praia, private services exist mostly ‘outside’ public ones, with
the exception of the disappearing ‘consultas complementares’, in
the ‘within’ public facilities category; in Maputo private services
would appear ‘outside’ but also ‘beside’ and ‘within’ the public
sector through its MCH ‘special clinic’ and ‘special services’; in
Bissau ‘outside’ private services exist, but private practice is
mostly integrated into public premises through informal
charges. According to the interviews illegal payments are
pervasive in the Guinean healthcare system, and serious
doubts exist that patients can access any physician service at
all without having to pay a string of arbitrary and unpredictable
fees.
. . . ok, this is what happens in the public [sector]: a patient
arrives, the outpatient visit [fee] is charged, which is 1,000
West African Franc (Xof) and this amount is for the
hospital. Then I am seeing the patient, and I ask for some
[payment] for myself. Perhaps I can ask around 2,000XOF,
and these 2,000 are all for me. Then the nurse who attends
the patient with me also asks for some payment, and so
does the attendant. It is a whole set of undue payments.
[Senior SMCH specialist]
Prevalence of physicians’ engagement in dual
practice
Of the 331 physicians surveyed, two were excluded because
they were not in clinical practice. 54.1% were male, with a
mean age of 44.8 years (Standard Deviation (SD)¼ 9.5). In
total, 73.1% were married and 90.9% had dependents: 4.1 on
average (SD 3.5). And, 46.6% had a second physician in the
family, 65.2% had a specialty, and 11.4 (SD 8.3) years was the
mean years of professional practice; 17% practiced outside the
capital city. In comparison with the other two cities, Bissau’s
physicians were more male (71.9%), had more dependents—7.7
(SD 4.0) and a larger proportion of them had a specialization
(see Table S3 in the statistical supplementary data).
Across all three cities, 34% of those surveyed indicated that
they practised in the public sector only and this response was
similar in each city. 11% indicated that they practised in the
private sector only (highest in Bissau: 16% and lowest in
Maputo: 6%). The remaining 55% engaged in some form of
dual practice (54% in Praia, 57% in Maputo and 53% in Bissau)
(Table 2).
The survey did not allow for the separation of the three
categories of ‘inside’ dual practice elaborated above. ‘Outside’
dual practice was indicated by 30% of physicians and ‘inside’
dual practice by 8% of respondents (categories b, c and d
above), while 16% declared engaging in both ‘outside’ and
‘inside’ forms simultaneously (categories a–d). Praia recorded
the highest proportion of public physicians indicating engaging
in dual practice ‘outside’ the public sector (42.2%), Bissau the
highest proportion who indicated that their dual practice
consisted of a mix of public and ‘inside’ private practice only
(17.9%), whereas Maputo showed the highest proportion of
physicians engaging in both forms of dual practice simultan-
eously (24.8%).
There are statistically significant differences in the simultan-
eous engagement in the formal public and private sectors
between Bissau and the other two cities, as well as for public
sector exclusive employment between Bissau and Praia. The
differences in the percentages of physicians engaging in all
forms of dual practice in the three cities were statistically
significant (2¼ 12.1; P< 0.01).
Health systems’ governance
Regulation and implementing institutions were described in the
interviews as ‘relatively strong’ in Cape Verde, ‘hopelessly weak’
in Guinea Bissau and ‘of mixed strength’ in Mozambique
(Table 3). The legal documents we reviewed showed that in
Cape Verde private practice is liberalized (GoCV 1991, 1989),
and physicians’ private practice within public premises legally
permitted outside regular shifts (GoCV 1987). Public sector
physicians’ working time is limited to between 8.30am and
3.30pm, with the explicit objective of allowing health personnel
to undertake private work in the afternoon.
In Guinea Bissau private medical regulation is very limited,
consisting of a 1986 law legalizing private practice (GoGB 1988)
and a 1992 decree establishing the requirements to start a
private clinic. Private practice in hospital facilities is neither
recognized or regulated, nor are hospital fees and physician
working hours (GoGB 1992). However, evidence exists that
illegal charges are ubiquitous (Einardo´ttir 2011).
Interviews and documents revealed that regulation in
Mozambique is patchy, as most private and public service
standards are defined, but exceptions are specified for many
hospitals, especially for the MCH. The MCH ‘special clinic’ is
legally permitted (GoM 1992), but other forms of special
services within public facilities are not. In 2007 the MoH
formally banned special services from public facilities (MoH
2007). The ban was enforced throughout the country, but
successfully ignored by the MCH.
Regulatory institutions were reported to be relatively con-
solidated in Cape Verde. The MoH appears to have substantial
influence on the ANCH’s management, and the national
Medical Council is a consolidated and credible institution,
holding regular elections and influencing health policy. At the
other end of the spectrum, institutions in Guinea Bissau are
weak and discredited, with a cash-strapped and ineffectual
MoH, a leaderless central hospital and a nascent Medical
Council. Mozambique has strong central institutions linked to
the party system, a rather independent MCH, and a Medical
Council still in the process of consolidation. The MCH physician
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lobby was reported to substantially influence national health
policy, often in an antagonistic relationship with the MoH,
although senior MoH appointments are typically drawn from
the central hospital. MCH’s ability to ignore the ministerial ban
of hospital special services illustrates their power and influence
within the sector.
I cannot go around and check whether my co-workers are
at work here at the department and ask: ‘where were you?’.
This is the independent republic of the Maputo Central
Hospital! [Senior MCH specialist]
When asked whether dual practice should be regulated, the vast
majority of physicians responded positively (84.5%), with
Maputo physicians showing the least enthusiasm for regulation
(71.8%) (Table 3). Although regulation may be seen positively
as ‘bringing clarity about the rules of the game for all
physicians’ [junior physicians in Maputo], many complain
that the current regulation does not do enough to foster private
practice outside:
. . . they say ‘go and open your own private clinic’, but then
you have to pay hefty taxes, and loans to start your
business carry regular bank interest rates. [Senior public
sector physician from Bissau]
The structure of the market for medical services
From the supply-side perspective, Praia is the capital city
with the largest number of physicians per capita (10.5 per
10 000 inhabitants), followed by Maputo and Bissau.
The overall proportion of specialists averages 65.2% among
the physician population in the three cities, with Bissau
being the market with the largest proportion of specialists
(Table 3).
In comparison with the other two countries, Cape Verde’s
doctors are paid a comparatively higher salary within a
decompressed salary structure (ranging from USD903 to 1802
monthly at current exchange rates) and receive pension
benefits. Remunerative exclusivity contracts are available for
those physicians in key political posts who agree to forego
private practice. The possibility exists for junior doctors to
complement their salary through emergency shifts and rural
posting allowances. In Guinea Bissau, salaries are comparatively
low and compressed (between USD315 and 344), and there are
limited allowances, negligible pension schemes and little
government support for the private sector in the country’s
insecure business environment. In Mozambique an intermedi-
ate situation was found, with comparatively higher but still
relatively compressed public sector salaries (USD645–989), and
no exclusivity contracts, although revisions to physicians’ public
sector contracts are currently under consideration. Almost all
dual practitioners (98.7%) reported that ‘increasing one’s
income’ was an important or very important reason for
engaging in private sector activities. Dissatisfaction with
public sector salaries is widely seen as creating the necessity
for physicians to engage in dual practice:
If I were paid enough [by the government] don’t you think
I would gladly give up this life of hopping from one private
practice to the other? This is not life! [Senior MCH
physicians from Maputo]
Praia was the capital city with the largest number of private
facilities per capita (2.21 per 10 000 inhabitants), although
Maputo was the one with the largest absolute number (142 for
its 1 178 116 inhabitants). By some distance, Bissau appeared to
have the least developed private health sector (0.7 facilities per
10 000 people), with very little inpatient care and surgical
capacity to speak of, although faith-based Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) were reported to play a significant part
in the supply of higher quality physician services.
Public sector fees are mostly low, when illegal charges are not
applied. From our survey, reported private sector prices appear
comparatively low in Bissau (USD6 for an outpatient visit at
Table 2 Physicians engagement in dual practice in the three locations
Type of physician professional engagement Praia Bissau Maputo Total
% [95% CI] N % [95% CI] N % [95% CI] N % [95% CI] N
Public only 33.0% 36 31.6% 30 36.8% 46 34.0% 112
[28.9–37.1] [27.2–35.9] [33.0–40.6] [31.7–36.4]
Total dual practice 54.1% 59 52.6% 50 56.8% 71 54.7% 180
[44.7–63.5] [42.6–62.7] [48.1–65.5] [49.3–60.1]
Public and ‘private inside’ public facilities 2.7% 3 17.9% 17 5.6% 7 8.2% 27
[1.3–6.8] [13.5–22.8] [1.8–9.4] [5.9–10.6]
Public and ‘private outside’ public facilities 42.2% 46 23.2% 22 26.4% 33 30.7% 101
[38.1–46.3] [18.8–27.5] [22.6–30.2] [28.3–33.0]
Public and ‘private outside and inside’
public facilities
9.1% 10 11.58% 11 24.8% 31 15.8% 52
[5.1–13.2] [7.2–15.9] [21.0–28.6] [13.46–18.16]
Private only 12.84% 14 15.8% 15 6.4% 8 11.2% 37
[8.7–16.9] [11.4–20.2] [2.6–10.2] [8.9–13.6]
Total 100.0% 109 100.0% 95 100.0% 125 100.0% 329
Source: Dual practice survey (2012).
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market exchange prices), intermediate in Praia (USD29 for
outpatient visits) and high in Maputo (USD35) (Table 3).
On the demand side, activity statistics and interviews with
key informants suggested that utilization of public sector
physician services is the highest in Maputo. Rationing mech-
anisms are in place in all three cities acting to moderate
population access to such services, through referral systems
(Praia and Maputo); legal payments (Maputo); and illicit
charges (Bissau). In Praia’s ANCH, waiting lists of less than 30
days exist for most specialties. In Bissau, specialist visits are
available for some specialties at the SMCH, no organized
waiting list is in place, and specialists reported being able to
see all their patients in their shift, although it is unlikely
patients can access such services without paying illicit out-of-
pocket fees (Einardo´ttir 2011). In Maputo, patients can access
specialists’ visits in central and general public hospitals if
referred from a lower institution, or upon out-of-pocket
payment through ‘special services’ in MCH; illicit charges
were reported to be uncommon.
Physicians’ own perceptions suggest that the demand condi-
tions they face for private sector services are more favourable in
Maputo than in Praia and Bissau, explained by Mozambique’s
booming economy, its capital city’s growing middle class and its
population’s consequent higher ability to pay. Interviews with
physicians described a ‘saturated’ private sector market in Praia,
a ‘difficult’ market in Bissau (limited demand and uncertainty
around recovering initial investment) and an ‘aggressive’ one in
Maputo (increasing competition among physicians). The pro-
portion of private sector physicians believing that lack of
demand is a constraint to doing further private sector work is
considerably smaller in Maputo (14.5%) than in Praia (45.6%)
and Bissau (48.8%) (P <0.01).
Discussion
The present study adopted qualitative as well as quantitative
methods for understanding dual practice and the market for
physician services in three African cities, which is a somewhat
heterodox method for analysing markets. This was primarily
justified by the absence of appropriate quantitative data sets to
undertake more orthodox forms of analysis, but also by
the innovative contributions that recent studies have shown
qualitative information from market actors can offer to this
kind of investigation (Ranson et al. 2012; Russo and McPake
2010).
We made simplifying choices in defining the markets in terms
of geographical and product boundaries. Our identification of
the market within the geographical boundaries of the three
cities had limitations: the flow of patients from and to the three
capitals’ healthcare networks is considerable. Our analysis also
considered the broad market for medical services, regardless of
the type of service provided. Although recognizing that such
generalizations may hide key features of particularly concen-
trated markets (Chang et al. 2011), we also observed that
distinctions between types of services become blurred in the
field, and as suggested in the literature, market boundaries in
less sophisticated health systems turn out to be very porous
(Garcı´a-Prado and Gonza´lez 2011). We achieved good response
rates to the survey. Although almost 50% of those sampled in
Maputo were not available, less than 8% declined to respond.
The remainder proved not to qualify for inclusion although the
register from which we drew the sample implied they should.
This does not then create a significant problem of bias in the
measured responses.
Given the existence of several ways of mixing public and
private services, more than one form of dual practice may exist
in poorly regulated settings, and future work on the subject
will need to take this into account. It is helpful to link the
phenomenon of ‘outside’ dual practice with variants of public–
private mix increasingly more integrated with public provision,
as it is likely that both users and physicians substitute between
these options. Our survey results appear to show that fewer
physicians engage in simultaneous public and private sector
activities (55%) than has been estimated by previous studies
among public physicians (Gruen et al. 2002; Prakongsai et al.
2003) although Gupta and Dal Poz 2009 show a much smaller
engagement in dual practice for physicians in Mozambique. The
studies above obviously refer to very different geographical
settings; however, if we consider as dual practitioners also
those public sector physicians who offer private services inside
public facilities, then the overall prevalence of dual practice
would be broadly consistent across the three locations, as well
as with the existing literature. It is also unlikely that the full
extent of ‘integrated’ dual practice was captured by the survey
as physicians may be least likely to admit to this form of dual
practice, or perhaps to recognize it as dual practice, if willing to
admit to it.
Our findings show that, consistent with the literature from
physicians’ perspectives, low public pay creates the necessity to
resort to private service provision (Ferrinho et al. 1998; Meng
et al. 2009). However, the three case studies suggest that
governance may be playing a significant role in shaping
patterns of dual practice; when governance is strong, as in
Praia, regulation may protect public characteristics of services
within time and space boundaries and may force private sector
activity ‘outside’ in either time or space, to where it is formally
recognized as dual practice. Conversely, where governance is
weak, as in Bissau, physicians seem to prefer to offer private
services within public facilities where it may escape regulation
altogether. This preference may also be shaped by the lower
ability to pay in the Bissau market than the Praia market:
potential profitability may not support the maintenance of
separate, external facilities. Interestingly, physicians appear to
welcome the regulation-driven separation represented by the
‘outside’, ‘beside’, ‘within’ and ‘integrated’ categories. One
explanation of this is that it might force customers to self-
select across differently priced services, thus enabling phys-
icians to extract consumers’ surplus more efficiently (Hirshleifer
1976).
The existence of ‘integrated’ private services within the public
sector may jeopardize accessibility of services, as patients may
be required at any stage to pay out-of-pocket for services they
are entitled to receive free of charge. Under this premise,
regulated ‘special services’ ‘within’ or ‘beside’ public facilities
may represent an effective way to protect public services, by
reducing or removing informal charges. As some authors point
out, when these are brought to light and clearly defined, as
in Praia’s ANCH’s ‘consultas complementares’, they might be
8 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING
welfare-enhancing, as they might provide wider product choice
to consumers, benefiting physicians and patients alike.
However, when these ‘special services’ are loosely regulated,
as within the MCH’s departments, they may instead generate
confusion and reduce the space for public services (McPake
et al. 2011). In a theoretical model of what we are categorizing
as the ‘within’ model, McPake et al. 2007 show that, in the
organization of a hospital’s public and ‘on-payment’ services,
equity enhancing and equity reducing outcomes can result,
depending on whether hospitals maximize profit or revenue,
and on the inter-relationships between demand functions for
the different services. A similar analysis could be applied to the
individual physician’s decision to allocate effort across two
services (public and private provision) and may also identify
equity enhancing and equity reducing scenarios.
Government attempts to regulate dual practice in low-income
contexts will have to take this added complexity into consid-
eration, which is consistent with some of the existing literature
on this subject (for example Gonza´lez and Macho-Stadler
2013).
Conclusions
The present study looked at physicians’ engagement in dual
practice activities in three African capital cities through a mix
of quantitative and qualitative methods, with the objective of
increasing understanding of the influence of local market and
governance characteristics on physicians’ decisions. We con-
clude that several forms of dual practice seem to exist in low-
income settings, and the blurred definition of the boundaries
between public and private market may play a critical role in
understanding physicians’ decisions to engage in multiple
activities. As this is likely to have repercussions for the
effectiveness of government policies to influence dual practice,
further analysis of local markets for health in scarcely regulated
settings is needed to support design of more effective policies to
improve access to physicians’ services.
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